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The 2020 constitutional changes considerably increase presidential powers while 
sending mixed signals about presidential transition. The main driver of the amend- 
ments were term limits. The “zeroing” of Putin’s presidential terms enhances certainty 
for himself by fostering uncertainty for others. But there is more to the amend- 
ments: Numerous changes are not new, they simply align the constitutional text with 
subconstitutional powers the presidency had been accumulating. The embedding 
of term limit circumvention in a comprehensive constitutional overhaul is a risk- 
hedging strategy to avert resistance by weakening the signal about Putin’s intentions. 
Constitutional changes are therefore an instrument of elite coordination. The amend- 
ments also increase presidential flexibility. This expedited regime personalization is 
detrimental to governance and will make repression more prevalent. But it also creates 
more risks for Putin. Regardless of how presidential succession will play out, Putin’s 
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The 2020 constitutional overhaul has expanded presidential powers. If 









opposite and redistributed powers away from the presidency. The main pur- 
pose of constitutional amendments became only obvious on 10 March, about 
two months after the reform was initiated on 15 January. By “zeroing” his cur- 
rent presidential terms, Putin now has the opportunity to run again for presi- 
dent in 2024. 
Avoidance of term limits is a common phenomenon in polities with directly 
elected presidents. However, the Russian case is special: The norm of term 
limits and alternation of power has been eroding since 2008 when Dmitrii 
Medvedev was handpicked as a successor. Medvedev immediately extended 
presidential terms from four to six years. Moreover, term limit circumvention 
was embedded in the comprehensive 2020 constitutional overhaul which 
includes articles ranging from social rights, national sovereignty, conservative 
ideology to executive-legislative and federal relations. This begs the question: 
Why such a long, winding and complicated process? Why not simply amend 
the one article on term limits? Taking into account the complexity of the 
changes, I focus on the major amendments with regard to the president, the 
relations of the president to the assembly, the federal Government (cabinet of 
ministers), and  the  State  Council. 
I argue that these amendments should not only be interpreted in relation to 
Putin’s future: They are as much about the past as well as the present. First, not all of 
the amendments are new. Many of them align the constitutional text with powers 
that the presidency had been accumulating on the subconstitutional level in 
recent decades. The changes are therefore instrumental in reducing 
discrepancies between various levels of Russia’s legal framework. Second, 
embedding the avoidance of term limits in a comprehensive overhaul is a con- 
scious risk-hedging strategy that attests to the constraint exerted by term lim- 
its. By weakening the signal of what constitutional changes are about, Putin 
sowed confusion and reduced the risk of counter-mobilization by elite actors 
and the broader population. Even though the changes were implemented in a 
preemptive top-down manner, Putin sought to draw in many loyal interest 
groups and allowed for limited bottom-up lobbying for certain provisions. 
Constitutional changes were therefore an instrument of elite coordination: 
By soliciting the support of numerous actors, Putin made them complicit in 
the potential prolongation of his rule. Third, numerous amendments increase 
presidential discretion and might be used in the future to personalize politics 
even further. By interlocking tasks of other branches of power while leaving 
the presidency unchecked, Putin enhances certainty for himself by fostering 





1 Russia’s Paradox of Governance: Strong Presidency— 
Weak Capacity 
 
The Russian presidency defies traditional classifications of systems of gov- 
ernment. While most comparative scholars tend to classify the system as 
semi-presidential,1 the 1993 constitution defines a presidency that is not com- 
patible with the democratic system of semi-presidentialism. The notion of 
“superpresidentialism”2 reflects these excessive constitutional powers of the 
president by codifying “separation of powers without checks and balances”.3 
This “constitutionalized presidential supremacy”4 serves as the legal basis for 
authoritarianism. Cross-national indices confirm that already in 1993, Russia 
boasted one of the most powerful presidencies in terms of formal constitu- 
tional  provisions.5 
Compared to other post-Soviet states, presidential powers have not changed 
on the constitutional level up until 2008. This is puzzling: In the same period, 
Russia had transitioned from a more pluralist, albeit defective democracy to an 
electoral authoritarian regime. These circumstances propelled the argument 
that it was mainly informal power networks6 which helped Putin to buttress 
his power while formal institutions have been largely  irrelevant. 
On closer inspection, however, the Russian presidency has continuously 
accumulated formal powers by means of federal laws, presidential decrees and 
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First, the growing asymmetry of formal powers in favor of the presidency is 
indicative of broader regime dynamics of rising authoritarianism. Second, 
despite these extensive subconstitutional changes, the Russian leadership had 
shown restraint with regard to constitutional amendments. The discrepancy 
between these two levels of the legal hierarchy had been widening. Hence, 
one of the preconditions for the constitution’s overhaul in 2020 was the neces- 
sity to achieve convergence between presidential powers amassed on the 
subconstitutional level and the constitutional text. 
Overall, Henry Hale’s concept of “patronal presidentialism” is most percep- 
tive to the dualism of formal constitutional rules in structuring informal pyra- 
mids of rent-distributing elite networks with the president at the top. Term 
limits are a particularly important formal institution as a focal point for elite 
coordination8 towards the end of the last presidential term. Therefore, even 
when constitutional provisions do not constrain authoritarian rulers, sweep- 
ing changes are important signals where formal and informal power is located 
and what trajectory the regime takes. 
Lastly, while the tremendous accumulation of presidential power has 
enabled personalist authoritarian rule, it has also led to a paradox of 
governance:9 While the presidency has accumulated more powers, state 
capacity has been weakened. Even the implementation of the President’s 
own orders, such as national socioeconomic goals, remains patchy as long as 
they do not relate to core interests of Putin and the ruling elite itself. Despite 




2 The Presidency after  Constitutional  Changes 
 
2.1 Mixed Signals as Risk-Hedging—Presidential Term Limits 
and  Immunity 
The constitutional changes regarding the eligibility for the presidency as 
well as the period after incumbency send mixed signals. While restrict- 
ing the mandate of future presidents to two terms in Art. 81(3) (deleting the 
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addition “consecutive” that formally allowed Putin to return to the presidency 
in 2012), but at the same time including an exception for former presidents 
(read Dmitrii Medvedev) and the incumbent Vladimir Putin in Art. 81(3), the 
amendment created the opportunity for Vladimir Putin to run again in 2024 by 
“zeroing” his time in presidential office. On the other hand, the constitutional 
amendments introduce enhanced immunity for former presidents and grant 
them the opportunity to become senator for life in the Federation Council, 
the parliament’s upper chamber. This appears to suggest that Putin might also 
plan to retire soon. 
Nonetheless, the “zeroing amendment” clearly demonstrates that the con- 
stitutional changes are a case of continuoismo,11 the avoidance of term limits in a 
personalist authoritarian regime without a succession mechanism. As around 
one quarter12 of directly elected presidents have attempted to overstay their 
terms, the Russian case fits a broader pattern of rulers contravening con- 
stitutional rules. However, the Russian case is special: Why was the term limit 
avoidance initiated more than four years before the end of Putin’s second term 
in January 2024? Additionally, why was it not achieved in a parsimonious way by 
simply abolishing Article 81(3), but instead was accompanied by a consti- 
tutional overhaul that encompassed 206 amendments? And lastly, what does 
the avoidance of term limits tell us about the role of formal rules such as con- 
stitutions in Russia? If constitutional rules can be overturned at the whim of 
an authoritarian ruler, it would be a useless exercise to examine constitutional 
changes, particularly with regard to presidential succession. 
Putin’s view on constitutional amendments has changed. While up until 
2008, he categorically denied intentions to amend the constitution, recently 
he appears to have moved closer to the view of Constitutional Court chair- 
man Valerii Zorkin of a “living constitution”. Since Duma speaker Viacheslav 
Volodin demanded more prerogatives for the State Duma on 06 April 2019, the 
public debate about constitutional amendments had been opened.13 
Three general models on term limit circumvention shed some light on 
why Putin chose to circumvent term limits. In an actor-centered approach, 
presidents overstay in contexts where rent-seeking is prevalent and where a 
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strategic decision is made that spoils can only be kept while in office as immu- 
nity for person and property is not guaranteed.14 In another approach that 
looks at power asymmetries and electoral uncertainty, term limits are more 
likely to be relaxed when electoral competition is low or declining.15 Lastly, in 
Hale’s prominent framework of regime cycles under patronal presidentialism, 
presidents in their second terms with sinking approval ratings are more likely to 
attempt the circumvention of term limits in order to prevent becoming a 
“lame duck” by elite defections from the main presidential patronal network to 
those of potential competitors. 
Each of these explanatory frameworks captures important facets of the 
2020 “zeroing” of term limits: Putin, his family and closest business tycoons 
have amassed enormous wealth. As the protection of property rights is linked 
to political power, the “collective Putin” is necessarily concerned about Putin’s 
post-presidency period. Moreover, Putin has managed to manufacture land- 
slide victories at the 2012 presidential and 2016 Duma elections that, despite 
evidence of election falsification, fulfilled its purpose to signal to the elite 
and the broader population, that Putin was going to remain the uncontested 
patron at the helm of the presidency. On the other hand, with the “rally round 
the flag”-effect, following the annexation of Crimea subsiding, approval rat- 
ings of Putin have plummeted after the unpopular pension reform in 2018 and 
reached low points of around 60 percent. 
Concerns about post-exit immunity, nominally high electoral support and a 
decreasing approval rating therefore form the background of Putin’s deci- 
sion to pursue continuoismo. The question remains why Putin chose to embark on 
a comprehensive constitutional overhaul instead of amending just the one 
article on term limits. The reason lies in the informational effects of term 
limits.16 These constitutional provisions are plain and simple, a violation can be 
detected easily by the elite and broader population, and amendments or 
abolition clearly signal intentions of the ruler. 
The signaling property of term limits entails trade-offs that Putin needed 
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successors17 and might eventually endanger Putin and his entourage. Yet, abol- 
ishing term limits had risks, too: A 2018 survey shows that respondents agree- 
ing a person should not be president more than two terms are more likely 
to take part in peaceful protests.18 An independent survey19 conducted on 20 
March 2020 just ten days after the “zeroing amendment” revealed that while 46 
percent of respondents would like to see Putin as president after 2024, a 
staggering 40 percent wanted him to step down from the presidency. The Putin 
majority was gone. Embedding the avoidance of term limits in an opaque con- 
stitutional reform was instrumental in weakening the signal. Hence, the risk of 
counter-mobilization by continuoismo opponents could be mitigated. 
Overall, the drawn-out process of Putin undermining term limits appears 
to demonstrate that the constitutional provision constrains more than might 
be assumed in a personalist authoritarian regime. Rather than abolishing term 
limits at once, Putin has been gradually chipping away at the provision: In 
2008, Putin nominated Dmitrii Medvedev as a successor who initiated a con- 
stitutional amendment that extended presidential terms from four to six years. 
Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 contradicted if not the letter, but the 
spirit of the 1993 constitution. From a different angle, Putin’s return in 2012 
implies that it was not enough to retain informal control within the “tandem” 
as Prime Minister because most formal and informal power was tied to the 
presidency. A second presidential term of Medvedev would have necessarily 
exacerbated the splits with regard to personnel and policy that had become all 
too visible already by 2011.20 
The amendment process of the 2020 constitutional changes also demon- 
strates that term limitsdo retain aconstrainingeffect: First, the “zeroing  amend- 
ment” was not included in the first amendment draft bill from 20 January. Only in 
mid-February, public statements by Kremlin insiders like Vladislav Surkov21 
implied that such comprehensive constitutional changes entailed the “zero- 
ing” of Putin’s  current presidential  terms. In this logic, the  Constitutional  Court 
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would find in its review of the amendment bill that the reform essentially cre- 
ated a new presidency necessitating the zeroing of Putin’s presidential terms. 
Putin’s problem was that his intentions were shrouded in subterfuge and 
secrecy to such a degree that the signal was broken. Speculations about Putin 
stepping down from the presidency and heading the State Council gained trac- 
tion in January and February. The amendments in February that strengthened 
presidential power, as well as Tereshkova’s “zeroing amendment” in March rec- 
tified the signal: Putin attempted to increase presidential powers for himself, 
and it was far too early for the elite and public to speculate about the “Putin 
transit” and potential successors. 
Nonetheless, Putin did not abolish term limits altogether, but reinforced 
them for a future president. This is a tribute to the associated risks of a con- 
spicuous defiance of the norm of alternation of power that might engender 
resistance. The main signal of constitutional changes was that Putin created a 
multitude of opportunities for himself while formally retaining the option to 
heed term limits. But even if the reform was mainly about the prolongation 
of Putin’s personal power at the helm of the presidency, Russia’s political class 
and the population nominally approved of it and are therefore complicit. 
Paradoxically, the constitutional term limit provision therefore exerted a con- 
straint that forced Putin to employ a risk-hedging strategy of embedding the 
“zeroing” of his  terms into a comprehensive constitutional overhaul. 
The two amendments on the future of former presidents should not be 
understood as an alternative strategy to continuoismo, but as an essential part of 
risk-hedging to weaken the strong signal that the zeroing of presidential 
terms sends to those discontent with personalism. For Putin, including provi- 
sions on lifetime senatorship in the Federation Council and enhanced immu- 
nity is a win-win-strategy: If circumstances force him to step down from the 
presidency in 2024, Putin enjoys enhanced security. More importantly, this 
potential alternative future immediately reduces the incentives for counter- 
elites and oppositional citizens to mobilize against Putin remaining in power 
after  2024  by  enciphering  the  signal  about  Putin’s  intentions. 
These two amendments also enhance the asymmetry among branches of 
power in favor of the presidency. The amended article 95(2)(b) on the preroga- 
tive of ex-presidents to become senators for life is accompanied by another 
article 95(2)(v) that grants the president the right to appoint 30 senators to 
the Federation Council, including seven lifetime senators. The first part builds 
upon constitutional changes from 21 July 2014 and increases the previous pres- 
idential quota of 10 percent of the Federation Council to 30 senators. Since 
2014, Putin has not made use of the prerogative to appoint senators, but this 





by offering sinecures or parliamentary immunity to close allies. These amend- 
ments offer the president discretion to further deinstitutionalize relations 
between branches by undermining the autonomy of the Federation Council. 
Per a 2001 law, former presidents already enjoy immunity. Constitutional 
changes to Art. 93 are notable for two reasons: The stripping of former presi- 
dents of their immunity is equalized to the impeachment process of incum- 
bent presidents. After changes, a criminal or administrative prosecution of a 
former president is only possible after supermajorities in the State Duma and 
the Federation Council as well as opinions from the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court. The federal law on presidential immunity from 
22 December 2020 goes even further: The immunity for ex-presidents is now 
for life as it extends beyond the incumbency. It also applies to criminal and 
administrative offenses committed in periods before and after 
presidential  terms. 
 
2.2 Interlocking Branches of Power to Boost Presidential Supremacy: 
The President and the Federal Assembly 
In the Address to the Federal Assembly on 15 January 2020, Putin declared 
that one of the aims of constitutional changes was to “enhance the role and 
significance of the country’s parliament”. As Putin announced that the State 
Duma would not only continue to approve the Prime Minister, but also deputy 
PMs and ministers, some early analyses assumed that while in the short-term, 
the effect of these changes for the balance of power between the legislature 
and executive would be marginal, any “dilution of hyper-presidentialism” and a 
stronger parliament could have “positive effects” and would be a good thing 
with unintended benefits in the long run.22 
On closer inspection, however, Putin shores up presidential supremacy 
while introducing mutual checks between the executive (excluding the presi- 
dency) and the legislature as well as between the two chambers of the assem- 
bly. Intraexecutive23 and intralegislative constraints help mitigate negative 
consequences associated with increasing regime personalization while leaving the 
presidency essentially unconstrained. 
First, the “dual executive” structure of the cabinet of ministers where five 
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PM is replicated in the assembly. This “dual legislature” creates checks and bal- 
ances between the upper and lower chambers with complementary responsi- 
bilities in the government formation process. Second, some minor additional 
competences in cabinet formation and oversight should not be interpreted as 
an empowerment of the legislature. Quite to the contrary, this (small) shift of 
responsibility creates opportunities for the President and the federal executive 
to shift blame to the Duma for potential blunders in policy making when the 
economic situation is worsening by the year. 
Irrespective of the weak constitutional powers of the legislature and the 
simple or even constitutional majority of the pro-presidential party United 
Russia since 2003, a number of instruments of parliamentary oversight exist 
such as parliamentary interpellations (parlamentskie zaprosy) or governmental hour 
(pravitel’stvennyi chas). With the first substantial constitutional changes in 2008, an 
annual report of the Government before the State Duma was introduced. 
While it is reasonable to assume that in an electoral authoritarian regime, the 
parliament is not able to hold the executive accountable, some oversight 
mechanisms do retain functions such as legitimation, or clientelism and rent-
seeking for interest groups or politicians.24 On 06 March 2019, for example, 
the Duma chairman Viacheslav Volodin grilled Minister of Economy Maksim 
Oreshkin and requested a second oral report because Oreshkin was 
unprepared to answer questions on the implementation of the National 
Projects during Government Hour. Forms of such loyal activism are even 
encouraged to help the President overcome information asymmetry, a char- 
acteristic malfunction of highly personalized regimes that reward loyalty 
and flattery. 
Constitutional changes also introduce a new Art. 103(1) on parliamentary 
control that enables both chambers of the legislature to direct questions to 
heads of state bodies and bodies of local self-administration. Furthermore, 
while according to the former Art. 101, the Audit Chamber was entirely an 
organ of parliamentary control of the State Duma, the amended constitution 
creates two patrons for the financial oversight body: The President presents 
the chairperson and half of the auditors to the Federation Council while the 
deputy chairperson and the other half of the auditors are presented to the 
State Duma for approval. Moreover, even though President Putin has had to 
veto legislation only on extremely rare occasion, the presidency has received a 
“super veto”: the Constitutional Court can be called upon to review bills even 
after they have been voted upon by the State Duma or the Federation Council. 
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As a counterweight, the Federation Council can now dismiss Constitutional 
Court judges upon the initiative of the President for “behavior that is not com- 
patible with judiciary activity”. Before, Constitutional Court judges were virtually 
unassailable.25 In sum, the amendments introduce mutual checks for all 
branches except the presidency. 
 
2.3 The  President  as  Chief  Executive 
The constitutional changes with regard to the relationship between the 
President and the Government (Cabinet of Ministers)—and the executive 
branch more broadly—are significant: they resolve a fundamental contradic- 
tion of the 1993 Constitution relating to the branches of power. While Art. 10 
stipulates the separation of state power in the legislature, executive and judi- 
ciary, Art. 11 states that the President, the Federal Assembly, the Government 
as well as the Court exercise state power. The former Art. 110 states that execu- 
tive power is exercised by the Government. As the President is the guarantor 
of the Constitution and ensures the coordinated functioning and interaction 
of all bodies of state power according to Art. 80(2), a widely accepted opin- 
ion among Russian scholars therefore has been that the presidency does not 
belong to any of the three branches in Art. 10, in particular the executive, but is 
located  above  all  other branches  of  power  as  an  arbiter.26 
The amended Art. 111 clearly places the presidency on top of the executive 
branch: Executive power is exercised by the Government “under the general 
leadership of the President of the Russian Federation”. On the one hand, this 
changes little in the overall institutional framework and in political practice 
for two reasons. First, even in the 1993 constitution, the President already had a 
number of executive prerogatives. The president could preside over cabinet 
meetings (very common), could cancel decisions and orders of the Government 
(practiced in the 1990s, but obsolete since the 2000s), and generally has acted on 
the basis of presidential normative decrees27 (very common). Second, in 
political practice, the presidency already maintained de facto leadership over the 
government which was buttressed by gradual subconstitutional changes by 
federal (constitutional) laws such as the 1997 law “On the Government”, 
presidential decrees and decisions of the Constitutional Court. The inclusion 
of the provision on the general leadership of the presidency of the executive 
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is therefore not a new presidential power, but the climax of a gradual process 
that has been going on since 1993.28 
The Prime Minister has been considerably weakened. While the President 
can still pick and dismiss the PM as before, now the President is entitled to 
dismiss the PM without stripping the whole cabinet of its duties. In the event 
of a major crisis or disagreement, the President may sack the PM while stability is 
maintained by retaining the deputy ministers and ministers. This dwindling 
power is underscored by the PM’s “personal responsibility before the President” 
(Art. 113) for all the tasks the Government is charged with. After constitutional 
changes, the PM becomes an even more technical and politically dependent 
figure than before. 
Lastly, the Duma has been granted the right to give its consent (plenum votes 
with a simple majority) not only to the PM presented to it by the President, 
but also to deputy PMs and ministers nominated by the PM. This, however, 
should be seen as an attempt to weaken the PM by introducing further checks 
on the PM via Duma votes on cabinet members while the President remains 
in full control both of the Government and the Duma. The crucial provi- 
sion which cements presidential supremacy over the Duma is located in the 
amended Art. 112(4). If the Duma rejects a deputy PM or a minister three times, 
the President is nonetheless entitled to appoint them. What is more, if the 
Duma rejects more than one third of the candidates, the President is autho- 
rized, but not obliged, to dismiss the Duma. In sum, the Presidency gains an 
additional check upon the PM while the Duma slightly gains leverage over the 
Government  while  remaining  utterly  vulnerable  to  the  President. 
The constitutional changes also further underpin several other previ- 
ous characteristics of the executive. The dualism of the federal executive 
acquires constitutional status for the first time. According to Art. 110(3), the 
Government oversees all federal executive bodies except those that are over- 
seen by the President. This dual executive was formalized in 1997 with the 
Federal Constitutional Law (FCL) “On the Government”. The law stipulated 
that the President oversees federal executive bodies dealing with defense, 
security, internal affairs, foreign affairs, and emergency situations, even though 
the President had exerted informal control over these policy domains before. 
This “Presidential Block” in the federal executive has been expanding over the 
years. In 1998, Boris El’tsin added the Ministry of Justice as a fifth ministry to 
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in an amendment to the FCL in 2004 that required a legislative supermajority 
that El’tsin did not have in 1998. Finally, in 2016, the newly founded National 
Guard was added to the list of bodies overseen by the president. The 2020 con- 
stitutional changes therefore mark the climax of presidential institutional gar- 
dening on a lower level that has been going on for years. 
The 2020 amendments codify this dual executive. Commonly, those bodies 
controlled by the President are referred to as “power ministries” dominated 
by siloviki, with other bodies subordinate to the Government referred to as 
the “economic block” with civilian technocrats responsible for socioeconomic 
policy making. This system of dual dependency among cabinet ministries and 
other federal executive bodies is a typical example of how checks and balances 
within—rather than between—branches of the state are introduced while 
overall presidential supremacy is maintained or reenforced. This presidential 
dominance is further corroborated by the new cabinet appointment mecha- 
nism in the legislature. While the State Duma approves cabinet members by 
voting on each deputy PM and minister, the Federation Council only conducts 
“consultations” on candidates in the corresponding committees without a 
plenum vote, and the outcome is not binding. Accordingly, the constitutional 
changes introduce an additional check to the “Prime Ministerial Block” of the 
government, while the changes in relation to the “Presidential Block” remain 
merely symbolic. 
A last noteworthy change to the basic logic of the executive was introduced 
with the new Art. 4(2) of the FCL “On the Government”: Deputy PMs and 
cabinet ministers may simultaneously assume other positions in the federal 
and regional executive, civil service and municipalities. This “personal union” 
was initially introduced in 2010 as an exception to the general ban mainly for 
presidential representatives in federal districts (polpredy). Art. 4(2) of the FCL 
reverts the previous version from a general ban to a general permission with ref- 
erence to federal law. The established bureaucratic practice indicates that this 
dual function has been rare and reserved for strategic geographical areas such as 
the North Caucasus (Aleksandr Khloponin) or the Far East (Iurii Trutnev). At 
this point, it remains unclear whether this practice would be used in the 
future to combine positions in the cabinet only with the duty of presidential 
representatives in federal districts, or whether the practice will be extended to 
other state functions such as governors or mayors. If anything, this vagueness 
attests to the increased flexibility and personalism of the presidency. 
 
2.4 The State  Council  Remains  Dependent  on  the  Presidency 
The State Council (Gosudarstvennyi Sovet) was created by presidential decree on 01 





his first presidency, Putin strove to strengthen the proverbial “power vertical” 
while improving feedback mechanisms between the regions and the center. 
The regional governors and presidents (Vysshie dolzhnostnye litsa sub”ekta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii) lost their seat in the Federation Council, and therefore their 
influence  on  national  law-making  in  the  Federal  Assembly. 
The creation of the State Council is yet another prime example of chang- 
ing the constitutional setup without amending the constitutional text itself. 
The “unconstitutional” status attested to the observation that membership in 
the State Council for all chief executives of the 89 federal subjects fell short of 
an adequate compensation and amounted to an “honorary capitulation”29 of 
regional executives to the President. Among others, the encompassing 
reform of federalism was accompanied by a federal law from 29 July 2000 that 
granted the President the power to dismiss heads of Russian regions. From this 
point forward, the President could dismiss governors as members of the State 
Council while previously, regional heads only forfeited their seat in the upper 
chamber of the parliament once they lost governor elections. 
The main function of the State Council as a consultative body attached to 
the presidency according to its statute was to guarantee the coordinated func- 
tioning and interaction between organs of state power (organy gosudarstvennoi 
vlasti). This task included not only the coordination of relations between the 
federal center and the regions, but also with the other organs of state 
power: the legislature, judiciary, and executive. In addition to regional chief 
executives, as of 2012 the chairpersons of the State Duma and the Federal 
Assembly, the leaders of the State Duma factions, and the plenipotentiary 
representatives in the eight federal districts had been members of the State 
Council. The key body of the State Council has been the presidium, which con- 
sists of the President as its chairperson as well as seven State Council mem- 
bers, typically regional governors. Presidium membership rotates twice a year 
with the President remaining the only permanent member as chair. This insti- 
tutional setup gives the President leverage for patronage by trading proximity to 
the  presidency  for  loyalty  from  regional  chief  executives. 
The 2020 constitutional changes granted the State Council constitutional 
status. Early commentary on the same day of 15 January 2020 interpreted the 
upgrade as a sign Putin would step down: At first glance, some presidential 
powers were also devolved to the legislature and the executive. Therefore, it 
appeared to many observers that the basic scenario for regime transformation 
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was that Putin would not seek to circumvent term limits, but rather step down 
from the presidency before 2024 and remain in power at the helm of the 
State Council.30 
While Putin’s address left room for speculation, the draft bill that was intro- 
duced into the State Duma on 20 January 2020 provided some more clarity 
while still containing one major ambiguity that would only be resolved with 
the draft bill on the State Council introduced on 14 October 2020. The new 
Article 84(e)(5) of the Constitution only stated that the President forms the 
State Council, but it remained silent about the Council’s chairperson. By con- 
trast, the passage on the Security Council unambiguously states that it is the 
President who both forms and chairs the Security Council. By delegating the 
provision on the State Council chairpersonship to federal law, there remains a 
theoretical possibility in the future that the position of the President and the 
State Council chairperson are to be split as one potential avenue for regime 
transition. Nonetheless, both the new article in the constitution and the sub- 
sequent federal law either mirror presidential powers or increase presiden- 
tial flexibility.31 
The new Article 84(e)(5) ascribes three main functions to the State Council. 
The first function mirrors the previous task of coordinated functioning and 
interaction between organs of public power (organy publichnoi vlasti), therefore 
replacing the old concept of “state power” with the new “public power”. The 
second function of determining the main directions of domestic and foreign 
policy of the Russian Federation copies the presidential power stipulated in 
Article 80(3). The third function of determining the priority directions of 
socioeconomic development merely repeats provisions of the 2014 law “On 
Strategic Planning”: The President has the overall leadership in socioeconomic 
strategic planning, the President’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly is 
defined as the overarching strategic document, and presidential decrees are 
the  core  instrument  for  implementing  goals  of  strategic  planning. 
In sum, the new article duplicates presidential powers rather than granting 
the State Council new powers. With the President as chairperson, the State 
Council remains a body at the discretion of the President with limited auton- 
omy of its own. A few days before the “zeroing amendment”, Putin said he had 
no plans to step down from the presidency to become the chairman of the 
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State Council. This constellation would create a “diarchy” that would lead to an 
“absolutely pernicious situation” in the country. A “strong presidential vertical” 
was “absolutely necessary” for Russia.32 
The State Council bill adopted on 08 December 2020 was much more con- 
servative in nature than anticipated. This appears to suggest that at least since 
the “zeroing amendment” in March, the strategic outlook of Putin and his 
administration had been final. 
In addition to defining the new concept of “public power,” the key provi- 
sion with regard to the future regime transition is Article 8(1), which stipulates 
that the President is the chairman of the State Council. As federal law can be 
amended with a simple parliamentary majority compared to the two-thirds 
majority for constitutional changes, this provision is less firmly set in stone 
than if it had been included in the constitution. For the time being, the bill 
renders a diarchy involving the State Council and the presidency impossible. 
The State Council will not be a new Politburo, but an auxiliary and consultative 
body attached to the presidency. Officially, it is supposed to support the head 
of state as an arbiter between the federal government and the regions, and 
should serve as a “generator of ideas”33 for the President. 
A comparison of the tasks and functions of the State Council in the previous 
decree and the new federal bill reveals that the core function remains unal- 
tered: The State Council assists the President in acting as an arbiter above all 
other state bodies beyond any checks while it provides the President with an 
additional forum to check and monitor regional executives. In return, the body 
also provides the federal vertical with a feedback mechanism and a consulta- 
tion regime built on the reduction of conflict due to extensive coordination 
with an—at least a formal—opportunity for regional executives to influence 
federal policy. 
But there are also a number of notable changes to functions and tasks. Even 
though the changes to the State Council have been mainly interpreted with 
regard to Putin’s post-presidency plans, the new tasks are primarily about 
aligning the regulatory framework with established past practices in public 
management, most importantly performance management. 
The changes are indicative of the transformation of federal relations in 
the twenty years of Vladimir Putin’s reign. The previous presidential decree 
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and compliance with, federal legislation, as well as directives by the President 
(ukazy, rasporiazheniia) and the government (postanovleniia, rasporiazheniia). The new 
provisions in the 2020 federal law, however, stress the need to discuss public 
state and municipal public management with regard to the effectiveness of 
regional executives and municipalities, the criteria and indicators (Key Performance 
Indicators, KPI) to measure this effectiveness, the monitoring of the 
implementation of these KPI, as well as rewards for achieving this pre- 
defined effectiveness  compared to other regions. 
The early phase of Putin’s first presidential term marked the swinging of 
the pendulum from the “authoritarian decentralization”34 of the 1990s with a 
weak center and a variety of subnational authoritarian regimes to “new 
centralism”35 as Putin’s main project to wrest back control from the regions. 
The presidential decree on the State Council effective until 2020 (Art. 4 
para 3) very much reflected this early concern with legal compliance of the 
regions with federal law.36 
Centralization, however, brought about another problem: While political 
and legal control was established, this centralized model did not improve gov- 
ernance and spur economic development in the regions, and therefore on the 
national level. The ensuing incentive system benefited those governors who 
demonstrated loyalty to the federal center by delivering satisfactory results for 
the incumbent president and the ruling party United Russia, while economic 
performance has been either irrelevant or negatively associated with reap- 
pointment or a sufficient protection from dismissal of governors.37 
While this incentive system clearly demonstrates the center’s dominant 
preference for control and loyalty, attempts to link budget spending, national 
strategies and projects—such as the 2012 May Decrees or the 2018 National 
Projects—to performance have been part and parcel of public management in 
Russia. Since 2004, the Russian federal executive has attempted to apply prin- 
ciples of performance management and measurement as well as results-based 
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the regions.38 The first presidential decree on the performance evaluation of 
regional chief executives (Decree Nr. 825 “Ob otsenke effektivnosti deiatel’nosti organov 
ispolnitel’noi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii”) was published on 28 June 2007, 
with the list of indicators used to evaluate regional governors amended by 
separate decrees in 2012 and 2019. 
To make sense of the 2020 constitutional changes with regard to the State 
Council and the concept of “public power”, it is crucial to recall that already in 
2008, a similar performance evaluation was introduced for municipalities 
that are—at least in theory—independent and not subject to directives from 
the federal and regional executives. Local self-administration bodies of city 
districts and municipal areas are obliged to report to regional executives about 
the annual implementation of KPI. Hence, the new concept of “public 
power” only formalizes the de facto integration and subordination of local self- 
administration into the regional, and therefore the federal executive that has 
been practiced before at least since 2008. 
While this application of performance management and measurement 
appears to suggest that the Russian government is concerned with improving 
performance, the reality is different: It is well-established that implementation 
discipline has been weak. Targets laid down in the Strategy-2020 were, on aver- 
age, implemented only by 29,5%.39 Between 2000 and 2012, only slightly more 
than half of all presidential assignments (porucheniia) were implemented by 
the respective addressees.40 The 2012 May Decrees demonstrate a similar 
picture. But even when targets are formally met, the overarching aim of the 
indicators is often missed. Higher salaries for medical staff, for instance, did 
not necessarily improve healthcare.41 Subordinates revert to a multitude of 
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lack of regional funding42 to outright data manipulation43 to shift blame and 
dodge responsibility. 
While most tasks and functions assigned to the State Council in the 
Constitution and the subsequent federal law are not new and merely codify 
established practice, the membership and internal rules of procedures were 
adapted to grant the President more discretion over the composition of the 
State Council. Members of the State Council ex officio are the President as its 
chairman, the Prime Minister, the Federation Council Chairperson, the State 
Duma Chairperson, the Chief  of Staff of  the Presidential Administration as  well 
as the governors. By excluding the Presidential Plenipotentiaries in the Federal 
Districts (Polpredy) as well as the head of the Duma factions, but adding the 
PM and the Presidential Administration chief of staff as ex officio members, the 
composition of the State Council is upgraded with more executive heavy- 
weights. The federal law permits the President vast discretion: In addition to 
representatives from the State Duma factions and local self-administrations, 
the President can grant any other person membership. The composition of 
the main executive body—the Presidium—also becomes more flexible. While 
previously it consisted of eight members—the President and seven other 
members, typically governors—the new provision remains silent on the com- 
position, rotation and frequency of meetings. For the first time, the federal 
law defines expanded meetings of the presidium to which members of the 
Government can be invited, but also heads of other federal and regional exec- 
utive bodies, local self-administrations and other unspecified organizations. 
The status of the Secretary is also upgraded: Previously, the position was held ex 
officio by a presidential aide (Aleksandr Abramov from 2000 to 2012, and the 
former Minister of Transport Igor’ Levitin from 2012 to present), a third-tier 
official in the hierarchy of the Presidential Administration. After the amended 
legislation, any member of the State Council can be appointed secretary. As 
virtually any person can become member of the State Council, the position 
could be filled with a political or bureaucratic heavyweight. But the personnel 
composition of the State Council announced on 21 December 2020 as well as 
the reappointment of Levitin suggests continuity.44 
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The federal law is vaguer than the previous decree on the State Council 
with regard to how decisions are formalized. While the decree stated that State 
Council decisions are formalized as decrees, directives or assignments of the 
President, the law only states that decisions are signed by the chairman of the 
State Council. The decree assigned the right to legislative initiative of deci- 
sions to the President while the law only states that decisions can be intro- 
duced to the Duma. Nonetheless, the State Council was not granted legislative 
initiative. But the vagueness of the new law compared to the previous decree is 
noteworthy. 
Since the launch of the National Projects by presidential decree in May 2018, 
the format of the State Council has been rebooted. On 27 December 2018, 16 
working groups were created that roughly correspond to the main spending pri- 
orities of the 12 national priority areas. In this new format, two-day expanded 
meetings of the presidium were held once a year that included representatives 
from the federal and regional executives as well as from state companies. 
The State Council therefore proved to be a useful public management body 
both during normal times for the 2018 National Projects as well as in crisis 
mode to negotiate federal strategy during the Covid-19 pandemic45 before the 
constitutional amendments came into force. The question that these constitu- 
tional changes do not answer is whether the State Council could play an impor- 
tant role in future regime transition scenarios. On many parameters, it remains 
weak compared to the Presidential Administration, the Security Council, and 
even the Government Cabinet. To date, the State Council is not an attractive 





On 10 March 2020, Putin addressed parliamentarians in the State Duma 
before they voted on “zeroing” his presidential terms and other expansions of 
presidential powers in the second reading. Putin argued that changes in the 
world and in Russia entail considerable “risks” and “challenges” for Russia. The 
President was not only the “guarantor” of security and internal stability, but also 
must ensure an “evolutionary”—in contrast to revolutionary—path for Russia 
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the Russian presidency: For the time being, the institution should be wedded to 
himself. 
By creating the opportunity for term limit circumvention, Putin aimed to 
reduce uncertainty for himself, and the regime. Even though he stays in power 
for now, it would be wrong to assume that presidential politics remain the same. 
Constitutional changes underpin the further personalization of the regime. By 
postponing the decision on presidential transition, associated uncertainty and 
risks are not only deferred to the future, but are also amplified. 
Three trends associated with progressing regime personalization are note- 
worthy in the run-up to the 2024 focal point. First, as I demonstrate in the 
section on the State Council, even though changes stress performance and 
efficiency, governance is unlikely to improve precisely because of the negative 
externalities associated with extensive presidential powers and excessive cen- 
tralization. Second, an increase in personalization implies that repression is 
likely to become more prevalent.46 The host of repressive laws that was rushed 
through the State Duma in late 2020 attests to this trend. And third, personalist 
rulers are much more likely to lose office through irregular means such as 
coups or mass protests and are more likely to end up in jail or exile than other 
types of rulers.47 Therefore, by attempting to perpetuate his rule, Putin inevita- 
bly raises the stakes for his own future. But even if Putin stepped down in 2024 or 
before, his legacy will be a highly personalized authoritarian regime with a 
constitutionally unconstrained presidency. 
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